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Early Visions of Justice
By RICHARD M. MOSK*
By the time of his appointment to the California Supreme Court in
1964, Stanley M6sk had been in public service for twenty-five years.
Most notably, he had served as a trial judge from 1942 to 1958 and as
California's Attorney General from 1959 to 1964.1 His established repu-
tation was such that during a United States Senate debate over the valid-
ity of the certificate of appointment of Senator Salinger of California,2
United States Senator Sam Ervin referred to Mosk as "one of the finest
constitutional lawyers in the United States."3 Senator Ervin's statement
was not mere hyperbole. Stanley Mosk began to have an impact on con-
stitutional law long before his appointment to the California Supreme
Court.
As the son of Justice Mosk, my objectivity in writing this piece
could be questioned. Throughout the years, when discussing his work
with him, I have often subjected him, in private, to suggestions and criti-
cism. Thus, I have no reservations, partially to balance the scales, in
according him some well-deserved public praise. In this brief tribute, I
will discuss some of Stanley Mosk's contributions to constitutional law
made prior to his tenure as a California Supreme Court Justice.
It is important to keep in mind the restraints imposed upon a trial
judge and upon an attorney general. A trial judge is required to follow
holdings of California appellate courts.4 An attorney general, in his ca-
pacity as legal advisor to various state agencies, officers, and legislators,
5
is seldom called upon to express his own views on what the law should
* A.B. 1960, Stanford University; J.D. 1963, Harvard Law School; Judge, Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal 1981-84; Member, California Bar.
1. From 1939 to 1942 Stanley Mosk served as a top assistant to the Governor of Califor-
nia. Bell, Stanley Mosk: The Politician Who Dares, PAGEANT, Oct. 1964, at 86, 89.
2. 110 CONG. REc. 18,107-19 (1964). An opinion by Attorney General Mosk answered
the legal objections to the appointment of Pierre Salinger as U. S. Senator from California. 44
Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 30 (1964). See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
3. 110 CONG. REc. 18,115 (1964); see also Elevation of Attorney General Stanley Mosk to
the California Supreme Court, 110 CONG. REc. 22,079 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Thomas
Dodd).
4. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 454-55, 369 P.2d 937, 939,
20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 0962).
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11157, 12519 (West 1976).
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be; rather, his advice is based on what he perceives the courts will deter-
mine the law to be.
Yet as Stanley Mosk demonstrated, a trial judge and an attorney
general have opportunities to have an impact on the law. A trial judge
often faces issues not directly covered by a controlling appellate decision;
an attorney general may be called upon to advise on matters not yet de-
termined by the courts. The California Supreme Court has noted that
"[a]lthough not of controlling authority, the opinions of the Attorney
General have been accorded great respect by the courts."6 In addition,
the attorney general can influence the law through administrative ac-
tions. As I shall discuss, Stanley Mosk took full advantage of these pow-
ers to further the course of justice.7
The Justice has long been an ardent supporter of civil rights. In
1947, then Superior Court Judge Mosk ruled that a covenant restricting
the ownership of real property to caucasians was not enforceable.8 In the
case, which attracted attention in the popular media, the pastor of a Pres-
byterian church and others had sought enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in an attempt to force several black defendants from their
homes in a previously all white neighborhood. One of the black defend-
ants-Major Frank Drye-was a veteran of World Wars I and II and
had been awarded the Purple Heart and the Silver Star.9
Judge Mosk sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to
amend, stating:
There is no allegation, and no suggestion, that any of these
defendants would not be law-abiding neighbors and citizens of the
community. The only objection to them is their color and race.
We read in columns in the press each day about un-American
activities. This court feels there is no more reprehensible un-
American activity than to attempt to deprive persons of their own
homes on a master race theory.
Our nation just fought against the Nazi race superiority doc-
trines. One of these defendants was in that war and is a Purple
6. Wenke v. Hitchcock, 6 Cal. 3d 746, 751-52, 493 P.2d 1154, 1158, 100 Cal. Rptr. 290,
294 (1972); see also Smith v. Anderson, 67 Cal. 2d 635, 646, 433 P.2d 183, 191, 63 Cal. Rptr.
391, 399 (1967) (Mosk, J., concurring), in which Justice Mosk contradicted one of his own
opinions as Attorney General. He employs various quotations from others who have changed
their minds on legal questions, including one from Justice Rutledge: "Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Id. (quoting Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949)).
7. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
8. Simons, Judge Stanley Mosk Race Covenants Illegal, 'Un-American', L.A. Sentinel,
Oct. 30, 1947, at 1, col. 6 (quoting from Wright v. Drye, an unpublished L.A. Super. Ct.
opinion).
9. Id. at 3, col. 3.
Heart veteran. This court would indeed be callous to his constitu-
tional rights if it were now to permit him to be ousted from his own
home by using 'race' as the measure of his worth as a citizen and a
neighbor.
The alleged cause of action here is ...inconsistent with the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. °
Judge Mosk's decision preceded by a year the decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer,1 in which the United States Supreme Court held that judicial
enforcement of private racial restrictions constitutes state action and vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
1 2
In a later opinion he rendered as Attorney General, Stanley Mosk
stated that "while the courts have not declared the offensive [racial re-
strictive] covenants void, but only unenforceable,. . . such restrictions
are contrary to the public policy of the State of California and no state
agency may constitutionally be party to their creation or perpetuation."13
The question presented to the Attorney General was whether the Depart-
ment of Veterans' Affairs should purchase property subject to racial re-
strictions for the purpose of transferring the property to qualified
veterans. The Department faced a dilemma--either deal with real estate
documents containing the repugnant restrictive convenants or limit the
property available for needy veterans. The Attorney General advised the
Department that although it would not be liable for damages for trans-
ferring property subject to the restrictive covenants, it should recom-
mend that the Legislature take action to render the covenants void.
14
In 1962, Attorney General Mosk opined that a local realty board
could not exclude an otherwise qualified applicant on the basis of race. 5
Under state law, only a member of the National Association of Real Es-
tate Boards could represent himself or herself to be a "realtor." Mem-
bers enjoyed other privileges as well, such as access to multiple listing
10. Id. (quoting from Wright v. Drye.) It was reported that the case was one of only two
in the United States since 1892 holding racial restrictive convenants unconstitutional. Id. The
1892 case was Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
12. 334 U.S. at 19-20. The California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in two
cases it decided that same year. See Cumings v. Hokr, 31 Cal. 2d 844, 846, 193 P.2d 742, 743
(1948); In re Laws, 31 Cal. 2d 846, 847, 193 P.2d 744, 745 (1948).
13. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 23, 28 (1961).
14. Attorney General Mosk stated, "justice would indicate that such restrictive covenants
would be declared void and legislation enacted prohibiting reference to such restrictions in
future deeds, title reports or other documents affecting title to property." Id.
15. 40 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 174 (1962). It has been said that a primary contributor to the
maintenance of racially segregated neighborhoods was the real estate broker. Marcus, Civil
Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. CHIL. L. REv. 171, 213 (1951); Comment, Race Discrimi-
nation in Housing, 57 YALE L.. 426, 430-31 (1948).
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services. To become or remain a member, a real estate broker first had to
be a member of a local affiliated board. Apparently, some local boards
discriminated against blacks in admitting members. The Attorney Gen-
eral found such discrimination constituted state action. He emphasized
that the state, by protecting the use of the word "realtor," had in effect
sanctioned discrimination by the local realty boards. In language rele-
vant to current controversies surrounding private clubs, he declared, "As
a general rule there is no legal remedy for the exclusion of an individual
from membership in a voluntary association [citations omitted]. But the
courts have recognized certain exceptions, especially where rights of
membership in associations have become important economically and
professionally to the individual."16
Attorney General Mosk also addressed the issue of school desegre-
gation. In ruling that a school board may consider race in adopting a
school attendance plan in order to desegregate schools,17 he stated, "It
seems clear that the Constitution does not require the states to ignore the
social and psychological problems that may result from de facto as well
as dejure segregation in the public schools."18 He also precluded a pub-
lic school district from segregating blacks and whites on school swim-
ming teams, even though the teams had no place to train other than a
swimming pool at a private club that barred blacks. 9
As a California Supreme Court Justice, Stanley Mosk has attracted
some attention for his provocative opinions on racial quotas.20 His ap-
proach, which approves what he considers affirmative action but rejects
quotas, has not changed from his early days as Attorney General. In
1963, he observed that one fallacy of quota systems is that once the quota
is filled, others from the group that comprised that quota may thereafter
be excluded arbitrarily.21
In 1964, he ruled that a housing authority could adopt and imple-
ment a policy of integration and designate an employee for this purpose,
so long as the policy did not deny public housing accommodations to
anyone solely on the basis of race.22 He sanctioned a "positive policy of
16. 40 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 177.
17. 42 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 33 (1963).
18. Id. at 36. See also California Aide Sanctions Shift of Pupils to Integrate Schools, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1963, at 10, col. 1 (reporting the Attorney General's opinion).
19. Information concerning this unpublished opinion was made available from the private
papers of Justice Mosk.
20. See, eg., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), affid in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 26
Cal. 3d 257, 286, 604 P.2d 1365, 1383, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 493 (1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
21. 42 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 33, 36 (1963).
22. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 82 (1964).
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integration" in housing, but stated that "the setting of quotas, even those
that are flexible, ultimately results in the denial of housing to one solely
because of race, when the quota for the race is filled or there is deemed to
be an 'overbalance' of his race in the project."
2 3
Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Mosk ruled that a racial em-
ployment quota violated the State Fair Employment Practices Act. 4 He
noted that discriminatory hiring practices may be met by demands to
hire members of the offended class.
Such a request or demand so long as it is aimed at ending an ex-
isting discriminatory practice would be a lawful objective but if
such a request or demand is aimed at securing proportional or
quota hiring in any work force then it would be the seeking of an
unlawful objective within section 1420 . 25
The Attorney General concluded by commenting on an issue that
has become significant some fifteen years later:
[W]hile we find a 'quota' to be invidious we do not necessarily find
a 'reasonable racial balance' to be unlawful. Or, while a demand to
hire a specific number of a specified race solely on the basis of race
is illegal, a demand that 'some' of a race be hired would not neces-
sarily be improper.2 6
In addition to his written opinions, Stanley Mosk took many admin-
istrative steps as Attorney General that have had a lasting impact in the
area of race relations. Among the most notable was his successful effort
to desegregate the Professional Golfers' Association ("PGA"). He did
this by threatening that the PGA would not be permitted to hold its
national tournament on any public golf course in California if it contin-
ued to exclude from its events qualified black golfers. 27 One such re-
jected golfer was Charles Sifford. The PGA moved its tournament, but
soon thereafter eliminated the "caucasion-only" clause from its by-laws.
Thus, one of the last vestiges of official discrimination in sports became
history.28
Attorney General Mosk expended much of his effort working with
state and federal agencies and private organizations to end discrimination
in housing, lending, and public accommodations.29 In 1963, California
23. Id. at 85 (emphasis in original).
24. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 200 (1964) (interpreting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420).
25. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 204.
26. Id.
27. See P.G.A. Warned on Bias, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1960, at 18, col. 2.
28. See Bennett, Critical Incidents and Courageous People in the Integration of Sports, J.
OF HEALTH, PHYSICAL EDUC. & RECREATION, April 1971, at 83, 84.
29. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1963, at 7, col. 1. Attorney General Mosk stated, "Racial
discrimination in housing and business are our two main areas of concern. .. ." Id. at col. 3.
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Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. named him to head a task force of
executives to eliminate discrimination both in and out of state govern-
ment.3 ' His approach was captured by a statement he made in support
of legislation extending the jurisdiction of the California Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission: "We are searching for new methods of
dealing with discrimination which will be effective without being repres-
sive. New laws must not only strike directly at discrimination; they must
also provide a framework within which prejudices are lessened.
'31
Recognizing the problem of possible police insensitivity in minority
neighborhoods, Attorney General Mosk sponsored a series of lecture
programs in which prominent black law enforcement officers spoke to
fellow police officers throughout the state on minority issues. One of the
lecturers he selected was Police Lieutenant Tom Bradley, who later be-
came mayor of Los Angeles. Attorney General Mosk took aggressive
action to thwart politically motivated efforts in certain areas of Califor-
nia, especially in the Imperial Valley, to disenfranchise, in effect, citizens
of hispanic origin.
Within the California Justice Department, Attorney General Mosk
actively recruited women and minorities to fill important positions at a
time when it was not deemed fashionable or politically expedient to do
so.32 He has often expressed pride that many alumni of his office have
become distinguished scholars, members of the judiciary and other public
officeholders.
Attorney General Mosk established the first constitutional rights
section within the Department of Justice.3 3 Its mission was to oversee
the enforcement of California's anti-discrimination laws, especially those
relating to housing and business activities. The section also provided
legal representation to the California Fair Employment Practices
Commission.
Stanley Mosk's early achievements in the development of constitu-
tional law extend beyond the civil rights area. In an opinion involving
the separation of church and state, Attorney General Mosk ruled that
the County of Los Angeles could not contribute tax funds to the Pilgrim-
age Play,3 4 which allegedly promoted a particular religion," despite the
30. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1963, at 43, col. 6.
31. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1963, at 7, col. 3.
32. As Attorney General, Mosk appointed the first female Chief Deputy, the first blacks
as department heads, and the first black career deputy to head a division.
33. See Bell, supra note 1, at 89.
34. The Pilgrimage Play, an annual production by the Pilgrimage Play Association, Ltd.,
dramatized the life of Christ and followed closely the King James version of the New Testa-
ment. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 105, 108 (1961).
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contention that the state support should escape constitutional scrutiny
because of the play's widespread fame and benefit as a tourist
attraction.36
Stanley Mosk issued several significant opinions as Attorney Gen-
eral involving religion and public schools that applied basic First
Amendment concepts. In 1964, he ruled that a state law which permit-
ted school districts to allow religious organizations the use of school
grounds for sectarian purposes was a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 37 He declared, however, that the law could be constitutionally
applied to permit religious services in school buildings provided fair
rental is charged, the time is limited, the school does not need the prop-
erty at the time, and the religious use is not immediately before or after
formal class instruction.3
Four years prior to this opinion, the Attorney General ruled consti-
tutional a law that permitted a public school to acquire books of sectar-
ian or denominational character for school libraries.39 Although he
stated that such works constituted appropriate literary or educational
material, he concluded with the following caveat:
Although the subject matter of books purchased for school
libraries is not reviewable on the ground that the books are or are
not sectarian or denominational in character, every caution should
be exercised to make certain that books of sectarian or denomina-
tional character are not used as a basis for advocating or teaching
the precepts of a specific religion or sect. Care is also indicated to
prevent books of sectarian or denominational character from con-
stituting an inordinate percent of the total library and thus altering
the very character of the library itself.'
Although a person of strong, principled opinions, Stanley Mosk has
been careful not to exceed his legal powers to promote his personal views.
During the early 1960's, as Attorney General he ruled that schools had
the discretion to pay for teachers attending sessions of the "Christian
Anti-Communist Crusade," and could permit students to attend.41 De-
35. The Attorney General observed that the play "may well be a production of cultural,
artistic and educational value to the community," id. at 107, but this does not alter its essen-
tial religious character. Id. at 109. He also ruled that the Constitution prohibits the use of
public funds to aid any specific religious purpose, not merely "aid of a single sect as differenti-
ated from other beliefs of other sects within the same religion [citations omitted]." Id.
36. Id. at 107.
37. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 62 (1964).
38. Id. at 69.
39. 35 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 68 (1960).
40. Id. at 70.
41. 39 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 45 (1962).
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spite his personal critical opinion of the operation and its promoter,42 he
noted that there have "been no contentions made that the sessions of the
'Crusade' constitute religious exercises or religious instruction."43
In 1961, the Attorney General's office responded to inquiries about
the John Birch Society from Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr.' In his
fifteen page response to the Governor, Attorney General Mosk described
it as a "monolithic authoritarian organization with the policy dictated
from above and no dissent permitted in its ranks."45 In describing the
Birch Society membership, he originated the expression "little old ladies
in tennis shoes,"'4 6 an appellation that has become a part of the American
lexicon.47 But he refused to accede to demands from some quarters for a
full-scale investigation of the group.48 He instead offered this advice:
look into the organization, listen to the ideas espoused, observe the peo-
ple espousing them, and ask questions. Then decide "whether to join or
oppose the organization or simply stay home and watch television ...
In America, preposterousness prevents the acceptance but not the ex-
pression of ideas."4 9
Although a consistent adherent to freedom of speech principles, At-
torney General Mosk recognized reasonable limitations on the practical
exercise of First Amendment rights. For example, he held that those
who litter may be prosecuted, even though they are distributing political
material.50 And he upheld the constitutionality of a provision requiring
the disclosure of the identity and address of the printer and publisher of
any printed electoral material.51
After ruling unconstitutional the State Board of Education's denial
or revocation of a teacher's credentials on the sole ground that the
42. Attorney General Mosk viewed the crusade as "patriotism for profit." Bell, supra
note 1, at 88.
43. 39 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 48.
44. Bell, supra note 1, at 87.
45. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1961, at 3, col. 2.
46. Bell, supra note 1, at 87.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. Times, supra note 45, at 3, col. 2; see also Bell, supra note 1, at 90.
49. N.Y. Times, supra note 45, at 3, col. 2.
50. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 190, 192 (1964).
51. 36 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 65 (1960) (ruling constitutional CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4573).
Just prior to Attorney General Mosk's opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribution of any handbill which did
not identify its printer and distributor. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Attorney
General Mosk ruled that Talley did not require a finding that the election statute was an
unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech and the press. He noted that unlike the blan-
ket prohibition of anonymous circulars of the ordinance in Talley, the narrowly drafted elec-
tion code protected the public's substantial interest in preserving inviolate the integrity and
fairness of the electoral process. 36 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 68.
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teacher had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimi-
nation in a federal proceeding, 2 Attorney General Mosk acknowledged
that to some extent his view had been superseded by United States
Supreme Court opinions." He then ruled that by virtue of Supreme
Court decisions, the State Board of Education could deny or revoke a
teaching credential upon proof that the teacher is knowingly a Commu-
nist Party member. 4
As Attorney General, Stanley Mosk addressed many other far-
reaching issues. He advised that certain "Buy American" provisions of
California law could not constitutionally be applied when they conflicted
with United States treaties. 5 He ruled constitutionally valid a California
law which provided that an unlicensed contractor cannot recover com-
pensation for work performed.56 In a widely publicized ruling,57 he con-
cluded that California could not require more restrictive qualifications
for appointment or election to the United States Senate than those pro-
vided in the United States Constitution. Thus, the governor could ap-
point to the United States Senate one who was not an elector in
California, 9 despite California law," as there was no such requirement
in Article I, Section 3, of the United States Constitution.61
As a trial judge, Stanley Mosk presided over many significant crimi-
nal trials. His decision to admit a confession in a widely publicized case
leading to a death penalty sentence was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.62 As Attorney General, Stanley Mosk was a vigorous
52. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 112 (1961).
53. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 201, 210-11 (1961). The U.S. Supreme Court decisions are
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) and In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
54. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 202.
55. 34 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 302 (1959).
56. 33 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 83 (1959) (ruling valid CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031).
57. See, eg., L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1964, at 1, col. 1.
58. 44 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 30 (1964).
59. "Under Elections Code section 20, elector is a person who qualifies under section 1 of
article II of the State Constitution which sets forth a residency requirement of one year." Id.
at 31.
60. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 25001 (West 1977).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, 3, cl. 3 provides: "No person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."
This opinion led to the appointment of Pierre Salinger to fill the vacancy created by the
death of Senator Clair Engle. See L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1964, at 1, col. 1. Interestingly, in Jan.
1964, Attorney General Mosk led in public opinion polls concerning the election for that
United States Senate seat. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1964, at 22, col. 2, 7. Attorney General Mosk
opted for a judicial career rather than national politics.
62. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). Crooker no longer represents the law.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 n.48 (1966); see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
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prosecutor and crime fighter. As counsel for the People in countless
criminal appeals, he carried out his legal duties by representing the Peo-
ple in efforts to uphold death penalty convictions,63 despite his expressed
personal opposition to capital punishment."4 In this respect he remains
consistent, for, although personally skeptical about the wisdom of the
death penalty, under the compulsion of the law, he has voted to affirm
capital punishment convictions on a number of occasions. 65
Attorney General Mosk won respect and support from the law en-
forcement community not only for his record as a prosecutor. He also
recognized that poor training of law enforcement personnel had been a
contributing factor to constitutional rights violations and lack of public
confidence and safety. His promotion of peace officers' standards and
training66 was acknowledged by a U.S. Senator who stated:
[H]e has been one of the most effective leaders in the effort to give
law enforcement the status and accord which it so richly deserves.
Through his leadership, California has pioneered in providing a
program of uniform standards and training and in-service educa-
tion for the 400 local law enforcement agencies within the State.
67
In my view, these and many other achievements place Stanley Mosk
in the ranks of California's most valuable public servants. This cursory
review of the area of constitutional law has left many accomplishments
unmentioned; my purpose has been only to provide a broader perspective
of his work and career in public service. I will leave it to others to chron-
icle more fully his many contributions to the law and to society. Any
719, 731 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1964); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964).
63. See, e.g., People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 472, 341 P.2d 679, 682 (1959).
64. As Attorney General, Stanley Mosk testified before several California legislative com-
mittees in opposition to capital punishment. See In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 634 (1968)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 63, 655 P.2d 279, 305, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77,
103 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting); In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 634, 447 P.2d 117, 131, 73
Cal. Rptr. 21, 35 (1968) (Mosk, J., concurring); People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d
555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965). In In re Anderson Mosk wrote:
[Because of my] personal belief in the social invalidity of the death penalty...
[para.]
I am tempted by the invitation of petitioners to join in judicially terminating this
anachronistic penalty. However, to yield to my predilections would be to act wilfully
'in the sense of enforcing individual views instead of speaking humbly as the voice of
law by which society presumably consents to be ruled. . . .' (Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court in the Mirror of the Justices (1957) 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 794.)
As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I might fervently
wish it to be. ...
In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d at 634-35, 447 P.2d at 131-32, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 33-36.
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13500, 13520 (Vest 1982).
67. Elevation of Attorney General Stanley Mosk to the California Supreme Court, supra
note 3, at 22,079 (remarks of Sen. Thomas Dodd).
[Vol. 12:383
Spring 1985] EARLY VISIONS OF JUSTICE 393
review of his work must, I think, take into account his many years of
public service prior to becoming a member of California's highest court.
Although his earlier achievements may not have the same profound im-
pact as his Supreme Court opinions, they have had a lasting influence.

